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By KEITH S. ROSENN*
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 1982
That inflation affects legal systems is obvious. It seeps through
foundations of law like an acid-bearing water and corrodes much.
Otherwise tightly-drawn contracts become ill-suited to commerce,
tort compensation fails to compensate, long-term capital markets
dissolve, the tax system warps.
Inquiry into a basic example is worthwhile. In an automobile
accident a worker is injured, disabling him from future work. Legal
principles would lead to his receiving an award of future earnings.
But how should that award be calculated? Inflation will drive up
the dollar value of those future earnings. Must judge and jury then
become (or at least consult) economists who predict future infla-
tion? Here we have the potential for a rich field of inquiry for the
legal policy-maker: how the award ought to be calculated, what in-
dices to consult, whether the matter can be turned into one of
technical calculation. All are worthwhile questions.
In this instance, one could argue that the typical lump-sum
award need not be adjusted. Why? Because the earnings on any
investments made with the award are likely to reflect inflation in
an amount roughly equal to the inflation in the worker's salary.'
The legal policy-thinker relieves the court of complexity.
Or consider the problem of long- and medium-term con-
tracting for financial payments. Over a period of time, annual pay-
ment of $10,000 in current value are to be made. How is inflation
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. See Note, Inflation, Productivity, and the Total Offset Method of Calculating Dam-
ages for Lost Future Earnings, 49 U. CH. L. REv. 1003 (1982). This view, that such lump-
sum awards should not be adjusted has been accepted by two states. See Kaczkowski v.
Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980); Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
The Supreme Court, however, has recently held that, at least in federal maritime cases,
lump-sum awards must be adjusted for inflation. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfei-
fer, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983).
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to be accounted for? Here once again the problem disappears in
part. If the parties are reasonably sure that inflation will be about
10% annually, the payments can be adjusted up front: $10,000,
$11,000, $12,000, $13,310, etc. The matter becomes knotty only to
the extent they are uncertain as to what future inflation will be
and want to shift the risk that future inflation deviates from the
expected inflation. In other words, the parties may adopt the 10%
per annum increasing schedule, and have the payor bear the risk of
a below-10 % rate, while simultaneously the payee bears the risk of
an above-10% rate.
The fixed sum schedule will do fine in reflecting such an atti-
tude toward uncertainty. When the parties want to shift all the
risk to one party, then complications arise. An index must be used.
But as aficianados of inflation and index-construction know, there
is no index that measures a "pure" inflation rate. Each index cal-
culates the value of a basket of goods under certain assumptions.
That is all. Different baskets produce different numbers. Different
assumptions produce different numbers.
On such matters Professor Rosenn is perhaps at his best.
Without miring the reader in statistical detail (although properly
directing the reader desirous of doing so to appropriate sources),
he explains the concepts and problems. For example, consider an
index of food. Iceburg lettuce, which constituted 10% of the food
budget, rises in price so substantially that consumers buy less of
the product, allocating it only 5% of the food budget. Ought that
price rise be reflected in the index in full or ought only one-half of
the rise be reflected in the index by halving lettuce's weight in the
index? By doing so, one learns, one is choosing between Laspeyres
and Paasche indices.2
The book first surveys the economics and statistics of infla-
tion: its causes, proffered cures, and measurement. Next comes a
35-page history of money. The succeeding several chapters are the
core of the book - a discussion of inflation and contract. Rosenn
uses this section of the book to approach the problem from several
angles: a comparison of civil law and common law attitudes,3 a con-
tract-draftsman's guide, 4 and a discussion of special contract-based
responses to inflation.5 The last half of the book is a grab-bag of
2. K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 4-5 (1981).
3. Id. at 72-129.
4. Id. at 130-66.
5. Id. at 167-219.
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inflation topics: inflation and compensation systems, inflation and
international payments, inflation and tax. The book concludes with
Rosenn's prescription: more, but not total, indexation.
In the course of investigating his general problem, Professor
Rosenn has painstakingly put together much detail, often encyclo-
pedic in scope, on subjects such as the history of money. (For ex-
ample, the reader is informed that seven centuries before the first
appearance of paper money in the West - when the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony issued bills of credit in 1690 - paper money was
used in China as receipts for the difficult-to-transport iron coins
used in Szechwan. The government eventually undertook the task
of issuing the receipts and, in time, the inevitable inflation arose as
too much paper was issued after the receipt-basis for issuance was
relaxed and paper issued without underlying coin.)6 Yet he
reserves most of his attention and energy for a comparative law
approach to the problem.
This approach focuses on two questions. First, what ought
American legal policy-makers do about inflation in tort, contract
and tax? Second, what have other nations done, particularly those
in Latin America? Unfortunately, Professor Rosenn runs into a
problem of finding an audience beyond those who, like myself, are
interested in the answers to both of those questions. As inflation
became a problem in the United States in the 1960's and 1970's,
there were few sources in which to ground analysis and adaptation.
Rosenn's early analysis looked to Latin America,' where the prob-
lem was old and persistent; where the legal institutions dealing
with inflation were in place, and where, in some instances, the fail-
ure of those institutions could be analyzed. Yet as time went on,
American scholarly analysis left the comparative approach in the
dust. Empirical studies of the problems of inflation abounded; de-
6. Id. at 4-5.
7. See, e.g., Rosenn, Adaptation of the Brazilian Income Tax to Inflation, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 58 (1968); Rosenn, Adjusting Taxation of Business Income for Inflation: Lessons from
Brazil and Chile, 13 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 165 (1978); Rosenn, Expropriation, Inflation and
Development, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 845. 1 have also done the same and benefited from exten-
sive correspondence with Professor Rosenn while doing so. Roe, Finance, Rules and the
Indexation of Brazilian Government Bonds, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1979).
8. See, e.g., J. BOECKH & R. COGHLAN, eds., Ts STOCK MARKET AND INFLATION (1982);
A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 170-98 (1982) (Brookings study discuss-
ing inflation-induced problems on the funding and benefits of pension plans); Gultekin,
Stock Market Returns and Inflation Forecasts, 38 J. FIN. 663 (1983); Hochman & Palmon,
The Irrelevance of Capital Structure for the Impact of Inflation on Investment, 38 J. FIN.
785 (1983); Carleton, Chambers & Lakonishok, Inflation Risk and Regulatory Lag, 38 J.
1983]
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ductive economists focused their minds on inflation,' and "bracket
creep" became a political, economic and tax issue which needed no
reference to Brazilian indexation.
Law and Inflation is an integration of the two approaches. I
am unsure, however, whether an American audience retains inter-
est in the details of what the Brazilians are doing about inflation,
as a prescription for our own inflationary ills, which seem to have,
if only temporarily, abated. More interest is now likely to come
from fears as to what Brazilian economic problems could do to
Brazil's creditors, such as Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and the
Bank America. 10 I suppose many, uninterested in the comparative
law approach, would prefer to read detailed inquiries into those
recurring inflation problems that have been untouched or only su-
perficially touched by others. 1 At times, Professor Rosenn set out
to do this. 2 One hopes that such efforts are not at end. Given
Rosenn's rather prodigious output, 3 one suspects they are not.
FIN. 419 (1983) (effect of inflation on public utility regulation); FED. RES. BANK OF NEW
YORK, ed., READINGS ON INFLATION (1979); Fama, Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors
of Inflation, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 269 (1975); Hess & Bicksler, Capital Asset Prices versus
Time Services Model as Predictors of Inflation, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 341 (1975); R. ImoBTsON &
P. SINQUEFIELD, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND INFLATION: YEAR-BY-YEAR HIsToRIcAL RETURNS
(2d ed. 1979). Empirical Studies of American institutions will not tell us about a widespread
indexation system. The United States does not have one. But one wonders about the pre-
scriptive value of studies of economies that do, such as Brazil or Israel, when the economic
systems studied are vastly different from the American. Perhaps the adjustments necessary
to determine the prescriptive validity of the comparative approach are so fundamental that
they do not provide much that is useful.
9. See, e.g., M. FELDSTEIN, INFLATION, TAx RULES, AND CAPrrAL FORMATIoN (1983); Bu-
low, The Effect of Inflation on the Private Pension System, in INFLATION: CAUSES AND EF-
FECTS 123 (R. Hall ed. 1982); Brealey & Schaefer, Term Structure and Uncertain Inflation,
32 J. Fm. 277 (1977).
10. See, e.g. Kilborn, Brazilians Look to West to Help Debts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1983, at 21, cols. 1-6; Ulman, Brazil's Rough Road Back to Democracy, Wall St. J., Oct. 21,
1983, at 29, cols. 4-6 (Brazilian legislature balks at complying with IMF condition to loan
that wage increases be indexed at only 80% of the reported inflation rate).
11. Studies of tax and inflation from nonexpert seem unnecessary. The Brookings In-
stitution, for one, has devoted considerable energies to the subject, see INFLATION AND THE
INCOME TAX (H. Aaron ed. 1976), as has the Federal Reserve, see Concoran, Inflation,
Taxes, and Corporate Investment Incentives, in READINGs ON INFLATION 157 (Fed. Res.
Bank of New York ed. 1979), and the National Bureau of Economic Research, see R. HALL,
ed., INFLATION: CAUSES AND EFFECTS (1982).
12. Rosenn, Protecting Contracts from Inflation, 33 Bus. LAW. 729 (1978); Rosenn, The
Constitutional Guaranty Against Diminution of Judicial Compensation, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 308 (1976).
13. In about a dozen or so years, over a half-dozen articles. In addition to those cited
supra notes 7 and 11: Rosenn, Controlled Rents and Uncontrolled Inflation: The Brazilian
Dilemma, 17 AM. J. Cosp. L. 239 (1969); Rosenn, The Effects of Inflation on The Law of
Obligations in Latin America, 2 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 269 (1979), the survey book
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To cover the extent to which inflation alters legal institutions
would require infinite expertise and investigation. So only a few,
such as Rosenn's study of contracts and judicial salaries, can be
done carefully and thoughtfully by one person. Given my current
particularized interests, corporation reorganization, I would like to
see some work on inflation's effect there. For example, the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that interest shall not accrue on unsecured
claims during a reorganization. When interest rates skyrocketed in
recent years, did bankruptcy become attractive to owner-managers
because it effectively gave them an interest free loan during the
few years of reorganization? This might not have been worth the
candle when interest charges were 5 % per annum. Did the calculus
change when rates went to 20% because the value of money was
declining approximatley 10% annually? Could an empirical study
sort out other volatile factors (e.g., an economic recession) to ascer-
tain the significance of inflation and the nonaccrual rule?
In contrast to unsecured creditors, secured creditors may re-
ceive interest during bankruptcy if their security is sufficiently val-
uable to support repayment of both principal and interest. " Has
this made creditor demand security from weak debtors more fre-
quently as inflation drove up interest rates?
Actual results uncovered by investigation may be counter-in-
tuitive. For example, conventional corporate finance theory main-
tains that debt-financing is cheaper than equity-financing because
interest payments are tax deductible while payments on equity are
not. The value created by debt is represented as the present value
of the tax deductions. Higher nominal interest means more deduc-
tions, which one ought to think would lead to more debt. (Higher
interest due to inflation does not represent a higher real payment.
An interest rate of 20%, coupled with an inflation rate of 10%,
results in no real after-tax interest for the 50% bracket taxpayer.)
But at least one empirical study suggests that debt is not in-
under review, a co-authored textbook (K. KSsT & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEvELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA (1975)), and an unpublished textbook (LAw AND INFLATION).
14. Secured creditors can be stayed form seizing their collateral as long as they receive
adequate protection. Bankruptcy Code § 361. Inability of the collateral to support, or of the
debtor to make, interim interest payments does not necessarily mean adequate protection
- a term of art in bankruptcy - has been given. In re American Mariner Industries, Inc.,
10 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); OToole, Adequate Protection and Post Petition
Interest in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 56 AM. BANKE. L.J. 251 (1982). But see In re Anchorage
Boat Sales, Inc., 4 B.R. 635, Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980) (dictum).
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creased."5 During the 1970's, interest increased but the level of cor-
porate debt did not. It would seem that one could not, at first,
explain these results by deductive reasoning. The best explanation
may be that some of the same forces for inflation created so much
free-floating uncertainty that managers preferred not to increase
financial risks. The early 1970's oil shocks affected inflation and
increased the perceived riskiness of many enterprises. Inflation
made debt's tax value rise, but, increased systematic risk made
managers wary of increasing debt burdens.
One problem not adequately discussed in this book is how the
courts should respond to statutes that are denominated in fixed
dollars, when the original value of which has been warped by time.
The problem is not limited to tax statutes nor to penalty or fine
statutes. For example, in the 1950's Congress set, and later rou-
tinely re-enacted, a liability limit of about $500 million on acci-
dents arising from nuclear accidents. In the late 1970's, a suit
reached the Supreme Court arguing that the liability limit, among
other things, was an unconstitutional "taking" of property. One of
the bases for the suit was that the enormous interim inflation had
eroded the value of the original limit. Did Congress intend to
maintain a limit of constant economic value? Or did it want the
limit expressed in fixed dollars so that in real terms it would de-
cline over time? Or, more realistically, did Congress simply not an-
ticipate the problem and, as such, what ought the courts do? Re-
value the express liability limit of the statute? Leave the sum as
expressed, in fixed dollars, although the courts knew full well that
the inertia of inaction would mean congressional inattention until
some serious problem (likely to be unrelated to the indexation is-
sue) forced the legislature to reconsider the entire matter?'
This is a window that opens to a jurisprudential issue of some
consequence: what should courts do with statutes that have worn
poorly with age? The most egregious will obtain legislative atten-
tion, but many will sit for decades "on the books" without legisla-
tive revision. Should courts update the statutes or refuse to enforce
them? In many instances, the aging will be due to the expression of
dollar amounts in fixed dollars. Here courts could update with in-
dexation. There is much to be said for such judicial action. But
readers will have to look to jurisprudential works to see the issues
15. Gordon & Malkiel, Corporation Finance, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMic BEHAV-
IOR 131, 158-62 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981).
16. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1977).
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in detail.' This may be because Rosenn sees a clear solution (in-
dexation) to many of these inflation-induced problems. Since the
"cleanest" and swiftest implementation of the solution would be
by legislation or contract (although one wonders why the solution
has not yet arrived), Rosenn has no special desire to examine the
judicial, second-best alternative.
One last point ought to be made about using foreign experi-
ence for American lessons. Rosenn sees a potential, although lim-
ited, usefulness in foreign experience.' 9 Although I have directly
examined little that is relevant, my research causes me to be much
less confident than Professor Rosenn that, say, the Brazilian expe-
rience provides us with useful lessons. My own examination of the
Brazilian government bond market does reveal spectacular growth
of that market once indexing began. Nonetheless, some rudimen-
tary, though time-consuming, empirical work casts doubt on the
value of that observation. Yes, the market for indexed bonds ex-
panded greatly. Most of the takers of the bonds indexed to the
inflation rate were, however, either Brazilian government agencies
or those required or induced by regulation to take the bonds. "
Neither constitutes much of a market nor much of a lesson. Maybe
the government bond market is an exception and the rest would
provide lessons. But more data would be necessary.
If an American audience interested in inflation is unlikely to
have much interest in a comparative approach, then the audience
must be that small group of those interested in the details of how
others, principally in developing economies try to cope with infla-
tion. Here Rosenn has, with much care and attention to detail,
gone through statutes, cases and regulations from several nations
and told us the legal story.
MARK J. ROE**
17. See G. CALABRzsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
18. K. ROSENN, supra note 2, at 389-96.
19. Roe, supro note 7, at 16-22, 63-65. Only when the index was tied to the cruzeiro-
dollar exchange rate was there much market-based interest in the bonds.
** Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, Newark, New Jersey.
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